SEC-03 / OT Security

Secure remote access for OT: managing OEM and integrator connections

OEMs and integrators need remote access, and it is one of the most common ways attackers reach OT. Route every vendor session through one brokered, monitored path in the DMZ, with MFA, approval per session and recording.

7 min read Updated OT engineersPlant managersCISOsMaintenance managers

Key takeaways

  • One path in: centralize all third-party remote access through a hardened solution in the industrial DMZ.
  • Access is enabled only when needed, approved per session, time-bound and tied to a work order.
  • Require phishing-resistant MFA for vendors and named individual accounts, never shared logins.
  • Record sessions to critical systems and have plant staff able to watch and terminate them.
  • Remove the bad patterns: remote desktop tools on HMIs, always-on vendor VPNs and OEM cellular routers that bypass your firewall.

Every mid-market plant depends on outside help. The OEM who built the palletizer, the integrator who wrote the batch logic, the drive vendor who tunes the line at 3 a.m. when it trips. Remote access keeps those people productive and your downtime short. It is also one of the most reliable ways into an OT network for an attacker. This guide covers how to give vendors the access they need without leaving the door open.

Why remote access is the soft spot

Remote access paths into OT tend to grow one emergency at a time. A modem for the compressor vendor. A remote desktop tool on the HMI for the OEM. A site-to-site VPN for the integrator during commissioning that nobody removed. Each made sense on the day. Together they form an attack surface nobody owns.

CISA's 2023 Guide to Securing Remote Access Software, written with US and Israeli partners, describes how attackers abuse legitimate remote tools because they blend in and bypass security controls. In January 2026, the UK NCSC, ASD's ACSC, CISA and partners published Secure connectivity principles for operational technology, with eight principles. Three of them speak directly to remote access: limit the exposure of your connectivity, centralize and standardize network connections, and ensure all connectivity is logged and monitored.

Does this apply to you?

Probably. Quick test:

  • Does any OEM or integrator connect to your machines remotely, even occasionally?
  • Is there a remote desktop or screen-sharing tool installed on any HMI, SCADA server or engineering workstation?
  • Did any machine arrive with its own cellular or internet router?
  • Does any vendor have a VPN account or site-to-site tunnel that is always up?

One "yes" means you have remote access to govern. Several usually means you also have paths you do not know about. Check your OT asset inventory for remote access fields.

The bad patterns to remove

Pattern Why it is risky Replace with
Remote desktop tool (TeamViewer, AnyDesk and similar) installed unattended on an HMI or engineering workstation Bypasses your firewall via outbound cloud relay; shared passwords; no central logging; runs on a production box Brokered access through the DMZ; remove or disable unattended mode
Always-on vendor VPN or site-to-site tunnel Vendor's network becomes part of yours; access is 24/7 whether needed or not Just-in-time sessions per work order
OEM cellular router inside the machine cabinet Completely bypasses your perimeter, often with default credentials Agree a planned change with the OEM (support contract, licensing, what depends on it), then disconnect, or move behind your firewall and broker it
Shared vendor account ("oem_support") No accountability; password spreads and never changes Named individual accounts with MFA
Direct RDP or VNC from IT into Level 2 Flat path from the most attacked network into control Jump host in the DMZ; session terminates there
Remote access with no approval step Vendor connects whenever they like Approval by the plant per session, tied to a ticket

Plant-floor reality: The OEM's remote tool is often in the service contract and the OEM will resist change. Start the conversation early, offer them a brokered platform that still lets them work fast, and put the requirement in every new purchase order.

What good looks like: the target architecture

  OEM / integrator laptop
        |
        | HTTPS, phishing-resistant MFA
        v
  +------------------------------------+
  | L3.5 Industrial DMZ                |
  |  Remote access broker / jump host  |
  |  - approval check, time window     |
  |  - session recording               |
  |  - per-asset policy                |
  +-----------------+------------------+
                    | session to named asset only
                    | (connection from inside OT)
  +-----------------v------------------+
  | OT zone: line 3 HMI, PLC eng port  |
  +------------------------------------+

The core elements:

  1. One path in. All third-party access goes through a single hardened, monitored solution, normally in the industrial DMZ. The 2026 secure connectivity principles recommend centralizing remote access rather than giving each third party its own endpoint.
  2. Brokered, not routed. The vendor connects to the broker. The broker connects to the asset. Where possible, connections into OT are initiated from inside OT, so no inbound ports are open.
  3. Named accounts and strong MFA. Every individual has their own account. The principles call for phishing-resistant MFA for external human-to-machine access. Remove accounts when people leave the vendor; ask the vendor to notify you.
  4. Just-in-time and time-bound. Access is disabled by default, enabled for an approved request, limited to a window (for example four hours) and closed automatically.
  5. Least privilege. The session reaches the specific assets in the work order, not the whole zone. File transfer is off unless needed.
  6. Recording and live oversight. Sessions to critical assets are recorded. A local engineer or shift lead can watch and terminate them.
  7. Logging to the SOC. Broker logs feed central monitoring. Alerts on access outside approved windows.

The approval workflow

Keep it simple enough that people use it at 3 a.m.

  1. Vendor or plant engineer raises a request with the asset, reason, work order and time window.
  2. The asset owner or shift supervisor approves. For safety-related systems, add the OT security lead or process safety engineer.
  3. The broker enables access for that window and that asset.
  4. Plant staff are notified when the session starts. For high-risk work, someone watches live.
  5. Session ends, access closes, recording is stored. Any changes made go through management of change, including updated PLC program backups.

For emergencies, define a fast path: a phone approval from the on-call supervisor, recorded in the ticket afterwards.

Proportionate options for smaller sites

Not every site needs an enterprise privileged access platform on day one. Pick the option that matches your risk and size, and move up over time.

Option What it is Fits Main gap
Minimum Vendor tools disabled by default, enabled per session by plant staff; MFA; named accounts; log of who connected and why Small site, few vendors, low-consequence process Relies on discipline; little recording
Intermediate Hardened jump host in the DMZ with MFA, per-vendor accounts, firewall rules to named assets, session recording on the jump host Most single-site manufacturers Approval workflow is manual
Mature Dedicated OT secure remote access platform with brokered connections, just-in-time approval, per-asset policies, recording and SOC integration Multi-site, many OEMs, safety-critical processes Cost and onboarding effort

The minimum option is still far better than unattended remote tools on HMIs. Do not let the perfect platform delay the basics.

Zones and conduits view

In IEC 62443 terms, vendor remote access is its own zone with a defined conduit into each target zone. The standard's zone and conduit requirements in IEC 62443-3-2 include separating devices connected via external networks. Treat the broker as a zone, assign it a target security level, and document the conduit rules. See zones and conduits and the zones and conduits worksheet.

Vendor requirements

Put these in contracts and purchase orders, and check them with the OT/AI vendor security questionnaire:

  • Vendor uses your remote access platform. No vendor-installed remote tools or routers without written approval.
  • Named individuals, MFA, prompt notification of leavers.
  • Vendor endpoints used for access are managed and patched.
  • Vendor follows your approval and change process.
  • Vendor discloses any remote connectivity built into equipment, including AI and analytics modules that phone home.

That last point matters more each year. Many AI-enabled machines and edge boxes ship with cloud connectivity for model updates or analytics. Treat that as remote access. See AI vendor due diligence.

Watch out: A vendor cloud portal that can push configuration or model updates to a device in your plant is remote access, even if no human ever "logs in". Govern it the same way.

Effort and cost

A brokered remote access platform for OT is usually a subscription or appliance cost plus a few weeks of engineering to deploy in the DMZ, onboard vendors and remove old paths. The removal work takes longest because each vendor needs a conversation. Budget for MFA licenses for vendor accounts. Many organizations phase this: first the vendors who connect most often, then the critical systems, then everything else.

Common mistakes

  • Buying a remote access platform and leaving the old tools in place "as backup".
  • Approving access by default because nobody wants to be the one who delays a fix.
  • Letting the broker sit inside the OT network instead of the DMZ.
  • Forgetting about cellular routers inside OEM cabinets.
  • No process to remove vendor accounts when engineers change jobs.
  • Not including compromised vendor access in incident response exercises. See OT incident response.

Monday-morning checklist

  1. List every remote access path into each site: tools, VPNs, modems, routers, cloud portals. Ask maintenance, not only IT.
  2. Search HMIs and engineering workstations for installed remote desktop tools. Disable unattended access today.
  3. Identify always-on vendor VPNs and plan their replacement with just-in-time access.
  4. Draft a one-page remote access procedure with the approval workflow above.
  5. Pick a brokered access approach and pilot it with your most frequent OEM.
  6. Add remote access requirements to your standard purchase order terms.

Sources and further reading

  1. Secure connectivity principles for operational technology (ASD's ACSC, NCSC-UK and partners, Jan 2026)
  2. Designing safer links: secure connectivity for OT (NCSC-UK blog, Jan 2026)
  3. Guide to Securing Remote Access Software (CISA and partners, June 2023)
  4. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, Guide to Operational Technology (OT) Security

This guide is general information for manufacturers, not legal advice. Confirm regulatory obligations with qualified counsel.

FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Is TeamViewer on an HMI acceptable for OEM support?

It is a common pattern and a poor one. Consumer-style remote tools installed on HMIs or engineering workstations create an inbound path that bypasses your firewall, often run unattended with shared passwords, and are rarely logged centrally. Attackers abuse legitimate remote tools regularly. Replace them with a brokered access platform in the DMZ, or at minimum disable unattended access and enable it per session.

What is brokered remote access in OT?

Brokered access means the vendor never connects directly to your OT network. They authenticate to a broker or jump host in a separate, controlled segment such as the industrial DMZ. The broker checks approval and MFA, then relays the session to a specific asset. Connections into OT are initiated from the inside, so no inbound ports are opened, and every session is logged in one place.

Should OEMs have always-on VPN access to my plant?

No. An always-on site-to-site or client VPN gives the vendor's whole network, and anyone who compromises it, a standing route to your OT. Replace it with just-in-time access: the connection is enabled for an approved work order and a time window, scoped to the specific assets, and closed automatically afterwards.

Do I need to record OT remote sessions?

Record sessions to safety-related, high-consequence and production-critical systems at least. Recordings help in incident investigation, in disputes about who changed what, and as a deterrent. Many brokered access platforms record screen and keystrokes. Store recordings securely, define retention, and make sure local staff can watch live sessions and terminate them.

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